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ARGUMENTS IN REPLY 
The City of Garden City and The City of Meridian (hereinafter "the Cities") submitted 
Appellants' Opening Brief on June 28, 2013. The Cities' central argument on appeal is that the 
1994 Order is invalid because the District Judges prior to issuing the order failed to employ 
any "suitable process or mode of proceeding ... most conformable to the spirit of [Idaho] code" as 
the Idaho Legislature required when it enacted Idaho Code § 1-1622. See, e.g., Appellants' 
Opening Brief; pp. 14-29. It is undisputed that the District Judges never made any factual 
findings or held any hearings or meetings in which the Cities were afforded the opportunity to 
appear, submit evidence, or present their arguments in opposition to the issuance of the 1994 
Order. (R. pp. 267; 285-94) The Cities have illustrated that the District Judges' failure to afford 
even basic due process or make factual findings before issuing the 1994 Order violated Idaho 
Code§ 1-1622 and the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 
794 (2009). Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 14-29. 
On July 29, 2013, Ada County and The Board of Ada County Commissioners 
(hereinafter "Ada County") filed Respondents' Brief in which Ada County advanced three 
primary arguments: First, Ada County suggests that the District Judges did employ a "suitable 
process" prior to signing the 1994 Order simply by "organizing a panel of judges" that agreed to 
sign the order. Respondents' Brief, pp. 14, 17. Second, Ada County incorrectly applies Idaho 
Code§ 13-201 and Idaho Appellate Rule 14 in contending that the Cities' positions on appeal are 
time barred for not having appealed the same in March 1995. Id. at pp. 18-21. Third, Ada 
County argues that the District Judges' decision denying the Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 
Order should be affirmed on appeal because the Cities failed to plead and prove a "change in the 
factual circumstances." Id. at pp. 11-13. 
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1. Despite Ada County's assertion to the contrary, the District Judges did not 
employ any "suitable process" prior to signing the 1994 Order in compliance 
with Idaho Code§ 1-1622. 
In Respondents' Brief, Ada County suggests that the District Judges' sole act of 
"organizing a panel of judges" which signed the 1994 Order alone amounted to a "suitable 
process" in compliance with Idaho Code§ 1-1622. See, e.g., Respondents' Brief, pp. 13-16 and 
p. 17 ("Creating a panel of the district court judges who agree to and sign an order is a suitable 
process .... "). Ada County argues that the District Judges were not required to hold hearings, 
consider evidence, or afford any due process-like protections prior to issuing the 1994 Order. Id. 
at pp. 13-17. Additionally, in an exercise of circular reasoning, Ada County suggests that the 
District Judges' process in 1994 was suitable simply because the District Judges determined it to 
be suitable: 
Because section 1-2218 grants district courts authority to create 
magistrate court facilities in its cities, but does not codify a process 
of doing so, a district court's inherent power to fashion a suitable 
process of doing so is guided by its own determination of a suitable 
process or mode of procedure. 
Respondents' Brief, p. 14 (emphasis added). See also, Id. ("Organizing a panel of judges is a 
suitable process because it complies with section 1-2218's requirement than an order is to be 
issued by a majority of the district's district court judges."). 
Ada County's arguments ignore the plain text of Idaho Code § 1-1622 as well as the 
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794 (2009). While the 
District Judges do possess inherent authority to fashion their own suitable process in deciding 
whether to issue an order pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-2218, the process they elect to follow must 
still be "most conformable to the spirit of [Idaho] code." See I.C. § 1-1622 and City of Boise, 
14 7 Idaho 794, 802-03. 
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In City of Boise, this Court recognized that in order for the District Judges' process to be 
"suitable" and in conformance with the spirit of Idaho Code, a governmental entity with a 
substantial financial interest at stake must first be given the opportunity to appear and be heard 
before the District Judges take action pursuant to § 1-2218. See 174 Idaho 794, 803-804 (citing 
In Re the Petition of Idaho State Fed'n of Labor, 75 Idaho 367, 370 (1954) (process must afford 
any interested person the opportunity to appear at a hearing) and Roche v. Superior Court, 30 
Cal. App. 255 (1916) (process must "preserve to the parties the fundamental essentials of notice 
and hearing.")). 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court held that to deny a financially-interested entity the 
opportunity to appear and be heard in a § 1-2218 proceeding "would be repugnant to our 
concepts of fairness and due process." 147 Idaho at 803 (emphasis added). Surely, it would be 
equally repugnant to the spirit of Idaho Code for a panel of District Judges to issue a § 1-2218 
order based solely upon an ex parte review of a one-sided and unverified petition. In addition to 
ensuring fairness and due process, preventing arbitrary judicial decision-making is a fundamental 
objective ofldaho Code and Idaho's judicial process. 14 7 Idaho at 802 (recognizing that issuing, 
modifying, or vacating a § 1-2218 order "involves judicial decision-making and, as such, is not 
administrative in nature.") (citations omitted). 
In light of this Court's holding in City of Boise, it is surprising that Ada County would 
now argue that the District Judges did not need to afford the Cities with any due process or due 
process-like protections prior to issuing the 1994 Order. Respondents' Brief, pp. 16-17. Issuing a 
§ 1-2218 order requiring a city to provide magistrate facilities undoubtedly imposes substantial 
financial obligations upon that city. (R. pp. 379-83; 389-90) Ada County's argument is 
particularly disingenuous considering its prior positions on the matter. In 1994, Ada County 
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(along with the City of Boise) prepared and submitted the petition which requested that the 
District Judges appoint a special master to "gather evidence, hold hearings, and report to the 
District Judges of the Fourth Judicial District his/her findings" as to the "appropriateness of an 
order" and level of proposed contributions. (R. 358-361) Moreover, it was Ada County who 
sought to intervene in the City of Boise's petition to vacate the 1980 Order, contending that its 
financial "interests would be impacted by an adverse decision" and its participation "allowed for 
a more complete, balanced and thorough review of the issues presented in [the] petition." City of 
Boise, 147 Idaho 794, 802 (2009). 
Notwithstanding, it remains undisputed that pnor to 1ssmng the 1994 Order neither 
Garden City nor Meridian were served with the petition or even notified that it had actually been 
filed with the Fourth Judicial District. (R. pp. 267; 285-94) The Cities were also not afforded any 
opportunity to appear at a single hearing or meeting, present evidence, or even express their 
position as to whether issuing an order was warranted. (R. pp. 267; 285-94)1 Additionally, the 
record is void of any evidence suggesting that the District Judges held any hearings or meetings, 
gathered any evidence, made any factual findings, or did anything other than merely review the 
unverified and one-sided petition before signing the 1994 Order. (R. p. 362) And, despite having 
expressly requested a hearing or meeting on their 1\1otion for Reconsideration or Delay in 
Execution, the Cities were never afforded such an opportunity. (R. p. 384) Given that the 
District Judges afforded no due process protections and failed to make any factual findings, it is 
1 Ada County suggests that informal conversations that allegedly took place sometime in 1993 or 1994 between the 
Trial Court Administrator and the Cities' respective Mayors regarding contributions to the magistrate rendered the 
District Judges' process in issuing the 1994 Order "suitable". Respondents' Brief, p. 15. However, the record is void 
of any testimony or admissible evidence establishing the nature and content of what was actually discussed. 
Regardless, arguing that non-specific, off-the-record conversations with the Trial Court Administrator amounted to 
due process lacks merit. 
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unreasonable to conclude that the District Judges had employed a process that was "suitable" and 
"most conformable to the spirit of the code." 
2. The Cities' arguments on appeal are not time barred as Ada County wrongly 
asserts. 
Ada County argues that the Cities' arguments on appeal are barred because the Cities 
failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Respondents' Brief, pp. 18-21. Ada County contends that 
Cities were required to appeal the District Judges' purported decision denying the Cities' joint 
Motion for Reconsideration or Delay in Execution no later than March 1995. Id. at p. 18. For 
authority, Ada County cites to Idaho Code§ 13-201 and Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
As set forth below, Ada County's argument fails for at least three reasons: 
First, Idaho Code § 13-201 and IAR 14 do not apply because the below proceeding was 
not a "civil action." Idaho Code § 13-201 applies only to appeals taken from a district court in a 
civil action. Likewise, IAR 14(a) governs appeals from "any judgment or order of the district 
court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or criminal action." In City of Boise, the Idaho 
Supreme Court specifically rejected Ada County's attempt to characterize proceedings pursuant 
to § 1-2218 as civil actions. See, e.g., City of Boise v. Ada County, 147 Idaho 794, 802 (2009) 
("While this proceeding may bear some similarity to a civil action, we decline to categorize it as 
such."). 
Second, even if § 13-201 and IAR 14 apply to the 1994 proceeding, the District Judges 
never entered a "final judgment" from which the Cities could have appealed. See, e.g., Spokane 
Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619 (2010) (clarifying that Idaho's 
appellate courts lack jurisdiction unless the lower court entered a separate, final judgment 
pursuant to Rules 54 and 58 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.). Here, it is undisputed that 
the District Judges never entered either an order denying the Cities' Motion for Reconsideration 
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or Delay in Execution or a separate final judgment from which an appeal could have been taken. 
(R. pp. 384, 389-90) 
Third, there was never a need for the Cities to file an appeal in 1995 because it soon 
became clear to all involved that the Fourth Judicial District and Ada County had decided to 
pursue an alternative option to the 1994 Order - i.e. the construction of a new, centralized county 
courthouse. In March 1995, it was the Fourth Judicial District's stated intent that the Cities build 
separate magistrate facilities in their respective city limits subject to various minimum standards. 
(R. pp. 379-83; 389-90) ("Our minimum standards for a courtroom are at least 700 square feet 
with a permanent, raised bench, and a pem1anent six person jury box designed with a full-length 
vanity shield.")). 
However, by October 1995, Ada County and the Fourth Judicial District had decided 
instead to build a "new courthouse" in Boise. (R. p. 3 91 ). Ada County elected to "provide at its 
sole cost and expense a single courthouse complex for both the District Court and Magistrate 
Division". (R. p. 35). Neither Ada County nor the Fourth Judicial District discussed the 1994 
Order at any time during the next thirteen years, effectively shelving the 1994 Order, if not 
rescinding it altogether by way of inaction. (R. 394). Building separate magistrate facilities in 
Garden City and Meridian would have been inconsistent with the plan to build a centralized 
courthouse in Boise. Accordingly, in 2004, when Meridian offered to provide space for a 
magistrate court in its new City Hall, Ada County declined. (R. 392-93) Ada County's claim 
that 1995 was followed by "nineteen years of effort by the courts to get the Appellants to provide 
magistrate courts" is unsupported by the record and simply not true. (Respondents' Brief, p. 19). 
Rather, all those involved had simply forgotten about the 1994 Order until 2008 when Ada 
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County located the order in some file and began using it as means of eliciting monetary 
contributions from the Cities. (R. p. 394). 
3. Finally, the Cities are not barred from filing a subsequent petition to vacate the 
1994 Order on the grounds that there has been a change in circumstances. 
Ada County argues that the Cities failed to meet their burden of showing a change in 
circumstances and should not be given "yet another bite at the apple." Respondents' Brief, p. 13. 
This argument mischaracterizes the procedural history below as well as the actual scope of the 
Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order. 
The Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order was a narrow motion limited solely to the 
issue of whether the District Judges employed a "suitable process" prior to issuing the 1994 
Order. (R. 320-33) The motion was filed in the declaratory judgment action and before the 
District Judges unilaterally converted the matter into a § 1-2218 proceeding. (R. 262) As stated 
on the record during the July 26, 2012 hearing, the Cities intentionally raised no other issues in 
that motion and anticipated filing additional motions in the future, including a motion to vacate 
on the grounds that there had been a "change in circumstances." (Tr. March 3, 2012, p. 40, 11. 19-
25; p. 41, 11. 1-18). A subsequent motion contending there had been a change in circumstances 
would have involved considerable factual discovery that would have proved unnecessary had the 
District Judges agreed in the first instance that the 1994 Order was invalid as having been issued 
in violation of Idaho Code § 1-1622. 
Despite the limited scope of the Cities' Motion to Vacate the 1994 Order, it appears the 
District Judges nonetheless made a factual finding that there had not been any "substantial and 
material change of circumstances" that would justify rescinding the 1994 Order. (R. 425) In 
Appellants' Opening Brief, the Cities illustrated that this was error on the part of the District 
Judges because the Cities had neither raised that issue in their motion nor yet been given the 
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opportunity to engage in the necessary discovery to meet the burden of proof. Appellants' 
Opening Brief, pp. 12-13. Said differently, that issue was not before the District Judges and 
there was no evidence on the record to support the District Judges' conclusion. The Cities 
should not be barred from filing a future petition to vacate the 1994 Order on the basis of a 
"change in circumstances," especially since there is no longer any need or desire for separate 
magistrate court facilities in Meridian and Garden City. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Ada County is not entitled to attorney's fees. Neither Idaho Code § 12-117 or§ 12-121 
apply because the proceeding below was not a civil action. See, e.g. City of Boise, 147 Idaho 
794, 802 (2009). Similarly, Ada County is not entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 because this appeal was not brought "frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." See, e.g., Boots ex rel. Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 396 (2008). There is little 
case law in Idaho interpreting Idaho Code § 1-1622 and this Court's holding in City of Boise 
supports the Cities' position that the District Judges were required to provide the Cities with due 
process prior to issuing the 1994 Order. Furthermore, Ada County is not entitled to attorney's 
fees on appeal because Ada County failed to set forth any argument in support of their request. 
See, e.g., Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 228 (2011) (party seeking attorney's fees on appeal 
must support the claim with argument as well as authority."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Appellants' Opening Brief, the Cities respectfully 
submit that the Idaho Supreme Court should void the 1994 Order. No order of any court or 
judicial body should be held valid where it was issued in clear contravention of due process, 
fundamental fairness, and basic notions of sound judicial decision making. If Ada County 
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wishes to pursue a new order, then it can simply file another petition with the District Court 
pursuant to § 1-2218. Upon the filing of a new petition, the District Judges can then ensure that 
a "suitable process" is employed by affording Ada County and the Cities equal opportunity to 
appear, submit evidence, and present arguments for consideration. In doing so, the parties will 
be afforded due process and the District Judges will be able to make a more complete, balanced, 
and thorough decision. 
DATED this_ day of August, 2013. 
MOORE & ELIA, LLP 
DATED 
GARDEN CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Frank Walker 
Counsel for Appellant City of Garden City 
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